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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This matter was tried before a jury commencing 
on Thursday, 14 November, 1957, and concluding on Mon-
day, 18 November, 1957. William H. Evans, deceased, had 
been married to Annie B. Evans during his lifetime and 
left Annie B. Evans as his widow at the time of his death. 
That. the defendant arid Appellant, Morgan Evans, was 
the brother of William H. Evans, deceased, and during 
the lifetime of William H. Evans, deceased, he and his 
wife, had lived a great portion of their life in a house 
belonging to Morgan Evans and occupied by him who 
had never married, and that at the time of the death of 
William H. Eva·ns, deceased, had only shortly moved out 
of the premises to a domocile of their own. 
Issue was joined upon the complaint of the plaintiff 
asking for the ownership of one half of certain cattle 
branded 44 and upon the answer and cross complaint of 
the defendant by the terms of which said defendant de-
nied that said deceased had owned any interest in said 
cattle, admitted joint ownership of grazing rights and 
farm land that had been used in connection therewith, 
asked for a parti tio·n of the farm land, and in the alter~ 
native asked for money expended in caring for the cat-
tle in the event the court found that the plaintill owned 
any interest in said cattle. Defendant consented to the 
partition of the farm land and both parties joined in 
asking the court to sell said farm land and to divide the 
money derived therefrom. 
Durham Morris, Esquire, attorney for the plaintiff, 
had entered into the employment of William H. Evans, 
deceased, and Morgan Evans, prior to the death of said 
Willia1n H. Evans, deceased, to arrange a collection of 
certain money from D. G. Page, and did do so and was 
to follow up the collection and was to receive 25)t of 
said items for his services. That the last payment there-
under was received under the terms of said settlement 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
in 1958 and after deducting 25% therefrom said attorney 
paid the balance thereof over to the parties herein nam-
ed. That until this last payment was collected in 1958 
said attorney was employed for several years prior to 
the commencement of this action by said William H. 
Evans, deceased, and Morgan Evans. That at the time 
this action was commenced by said attorney the D. G. 
Page item was not completed nor was it completed at 
the time this matter was tried, but the matter has been 
completed, and the money collected and paid by said at-
torney after deducting his 25 jf fee, since notice of ap-
peal was filed in connection with this matter. That 
many items were volunteered by said attorney and used 
against Morgan Evans without his consent, to the preju-
dice of the jury, while this attorney and client relation-
ship existed between said Durham Morris and said Mor-
gan Evans. That the trial court failed to take any action 
whatsoever to protect this attorney and client relation-
ship. 
The jury found for the plaintiff on most issues with 
some monetary items to the defendant to pay for the ex-
penses he had incurred in running said cattle. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. That the trial court erred in allowing this matter 
to be presented to the jury at all after the disclosure of 
an existing attorney and client relationship between the 
plaintiff's attorney and the defendant. 
2. That the trial court erred in failing to allow a 
portion of defendant's objection to plaintiff's Memoran-
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THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THIS 
MATTER TO BE PRESENTED TO THE JURY AT ALL 
AFTER THE DISCLOSURE OF AN EXISTING AT-
TORNEY AND CLIENT RELATIONSIDP BETWEEN 
TH·E PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY AND THE DEFEND-
ANT. 
Very early in the trial of this matter it came to 
light before the trial court that there was still an exist-
ing attorney and client relationship between the defend-
and and the plaintiff's attorney. The transcript of evi-
dence shows that during the direct examination of the 
first witness this came to light. This is shown at the 
time of the identification of Exhibit "1" on page 9, Line 
11 of the transcript and continuing therein to page 13, 
Line 26. At that time Mrs. Evans in identifying the D. G. 
Page lease testified that there was still money coming 
on the matter and that she had not seen it for approxi-
mately 5 years until the time of identification and that 
she had not known where the instrument was. This 
showed that same was volunteered by counsel at that 
time without knowledge of the plaintiff. The transcript 
will sho\V that this was before the noon recess during the 
first day of a prolonged trial, during which there were 
constant violations of an existing attorney and client re-
lationship. The trial court on its own motion should 
have stopped the trial at that time and discharged the 
jury, and failing to do so has done irreparable damage 
to the defendant's substantive rights inasmuch as it 
would now be impossible to retry this matter in Beaver 
County and that the volunteering of this i'nformation by 
counsel has now made plaintiff aware of same to where 
on a retrial same could be subpoenied. 
Further violations are sho\vn in the transcript of 
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testimony on Page 161, Line 5; Page 164, Line 17 to Page 
167, Line 21; Page 170, line 23 to Page 172, Line 6; Page 
175, Line 10 to Page 176, Line 27; Page 176, Line 30 to 
Page 178, Line 29; Page 222, Line 8 to Line 25; Page 253, 
Line 21 to Page 257, Line 27. It is again clearly shown 
that the work was not completed on Page 166, Line 24 
to Line 30 of the transcript of said testimony. There is a 
complete breakdown in the attorney and client relation-
ships and confidences in the calling of the defenda·nt as 
an adverse witness and questioning about the matter for 
which said attorney was employed as is clearly shown 
by the transcript at page 153 to page 234 and again at 
page 248 to page 268. Objections were made at various 
places on the basis of an existing attorney and client re-
lationship. However, the trial court was never able to 
see this matter and ruled as though the attorney had 
been subpoened i'nto court with the information. In all 
probability that ruling would have been correct had the 
fact situation been that, but there is a great difference in 
the position of an attorney subpoened into court, not as 
an advocate for either party, and being questioned and 
made to produce exhibits and information as of the na-
ture of this matter, and the same attorney voluntarily 
going into court as an advocate and heartlessly grilling 
a person by whom he is employed in connection with an-
other matter, and said grilling is about the subject mat-
ter of the employment between said attorney and said 
person, which has not as yet been completed. 
Admittedly, the undersigned is a novice at the prac-
tice of law, but after going through this trial, the under-
signed cannot help but feel that said undersigned has 
entirely failed to show the trial court this flagrant viola-
tion. After a great deal of deliberation that undersigned 
cannot come forth with the thought that the trial judge, 
that heard this rna tter, intentionally allowed this type 
of violation and disregard of the client's rights and all 
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that an attorney holds sacred, and therefore must con-
clude that the undersigned has failed in his job as an 
advocate in showing the trial court the flagrant nature 
of this abuse. 
McWhirter vs. Donaldson, 36 U 293, 104 P. 731 
charges an attorney to refrain from entering into an al-
liance or incurring any obligation connected with litiga-
tion in which he is engaged as counsel that would place 
him in position where his personal interest would be 
adverse to those of his client. In the matter now before 
this court certai'nly counsel has not followed this doc-
trine. The undersigned well remembers his recent la\v 
school days and the statement that no one can serve two 
masters. Admittedly, country practice is full of situations 
where a practitioner wakes up attempting to serve two 
masters. However, I believe that the course is with-
drawal if an attorney gets i'nto this position other than 
intentionally, going ahead and attempting to deter-
mine which client should be benefited and which should 
be harmed by continuing representation. 
Surely, a trial court, cannot turn its back upon an 
attorney representing one party in litigation, who ad-
mittedly has unfinished business in his office for the 
other party of said litigation. Our Utah Code Annotated, 
Title 78-51-26, Subsection 5 reads as follows: "To main-
tain inviolate the confidences, and at every peril to him-
self to preserve the secrets, of his client." Certainly the 
legislature meant for the courts to enforce this section of 
the statute or they would not have included same in our 
current Codification of the law. 
An outstanding example or standard for this situa-
tion is found in the old Corpus Juris, Volume 6, page 590 
and 591 under Attorney and Client, Section 49 (b) Rep-
resenting Conflicting Interests, note 65 taken from In Re 
Boone, 83 Fed. 944. "The test of inconsistency is not whe-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
ther the attorney has ever appeared for the party against 
whom he now proposes to appear, but it is whether his 
accepting the new retainer will require him, in forward-
ing the interests of his new client, to do anything which 
will injuriously affect his former client in any rna tter 
in which he formerly represented him, and also whether 
he \"viii be called upon, in his new relation to use against 
his former client any knowledge or information acquired 
through their former connection." Can we say in this 
matter now before this court that this standard has been 
followed? 
In regard to representing Adverse Interests Corpus 
Juris, Volume 6, Page 619, Section 105 states, "It is the 
general and well settled rule that an attorney who has 
acted as such for one side may not render services pro-
fessionally in the same case to the other side, nor i'n any 
event, whether it is in the same case or not, may he as-
sume a position hostile to his client, and one inimical to 
the very interests he was engaged to protect, unless he 
is expressly authorized so to do; and it makes no differ-
ence in this respect whether or not the relation itself has 
been terminated, for the obligation of fidelity and loyal-
ly still continues." Had this standard been followed in the 
matter now before this court certainly plaintiff's counsel 
would have refused to represent either of these parties. 
Certainly the trial court erred in the standard applied 
and should have applied this standard and not allowed 
this matter to go to the jury. 
POINT 2 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
ALLOW A PORTION OF DEFENDANT'S OBJE'CTIONS 
TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND 
DISBURSEMENTS. 
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The court's attention is invited to the testimony of 
J. Pratt Allred in the transcript, which commences at 
page 117 and terminates at page 125. There is nothing In 
his testimony except the identification of items that 
were admitted by the pleadings. The answer of the de-
fendant admitted that the grazing rights were jointly 
owned. Mr. Allred's entire testimony is to the effect that 
his office records showed this. 
At this point one becomes concerned with what is 
the purpose of pleadings. Items that are admitted are 
still proven by witnesses brought at great inconvenience 
to them and great expense, to stand around a court roon1 
and spend 20 minutes in testimony identifying items 
which are concerned with a subject matter that has been 
admitted. The cost of this item is objected to, and the 
trial court overrules the objections. The result is, that 
your client pays for the costs of proving items that he 
has already admitted. Under those conditions what is 
the purpose of ever admitting anything? Why not deny 
on the chance that proof may fail? Certainly the thought 
of notice pleading is to cut down on costs and wasting 
time proving items that are admitted. Certainly when 
this is done and proof is made regardless, the person 
who admits the items should not be assessed the costs of 
proving same. 
CONCLUSIONS 
That a trial court has a duty to protect the rights of 
an individual who comes before said trial as a defendant 
from plaintiff's attorney, who admits that there is still 
unfinished business between said attorney and said de-
fendant and who is volunteering documents and inform-
ation gained from said defendant in the course of said un-
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finished business against the defendant. That a trial 
court should not allow costs to prove rna tters already 
admitted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PATRICK H. FENTON 
Attorney for Appellant. 
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